Cryptanalysis of the generalised Legendre pseudorandom function

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EPFL

Background

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Legendre symbol

Let p be an odd prime.

$$\left(\frac{x}{p}\right) = \left\{ \begin{array}{cc} 1 & \text{if } x \in \mathbb{F}_p \text{ is a square} \\ -1 & \text{if } x \in \mathbb{F}_p \text{ is not a square.} \end{array} \right.$$

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$$\left(\frac{a}{p}\right)\left(\frac{b}{p}\right) = \left(\frac{ab}{p}\right).$$

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Ethereum, 2019 [Fei19]: Online challenges to break the function.

Legendre sequence

Let $a \in \mathbb{F}_p$ and $L \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\{a\}_L := \left(\frac{a}{p}\right), \left(\frac{a+1}{p}\right), \left(\frac{a+2}{p}\right), \dots, \left(\frac{a+L-1}{p}\right).$$

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Assumption

For $L = 2\lfloor \log p \rfloor$ we have

$${a}_L = {b}_L$$
 if and only if $a = b$.

Generalised Legendre sequence

Let $f \in \mathbb{F}_p[x]_r$ and $L \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\{f\}_L := \left(\frac{f(0)}{p}\right), \left(\frac{f(1)}{p}\right), \left(\frac{f(2)}{p}\right), \ldots, \left(\frac{f(L-1)}{p}\right).$$

Generalised assumption:

For $L = 2|r\log p|$ we have

$$\{f\}_L = \{g\}_L$$
 if and only if $f = g$.

Problem: Given access to $\mathcal{O}_f(x) = \left(\frac{f(x)}{p}\right)$, find f.

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Generate random g(x) and look for $\{g\}_L$ in the table.

If $\{g\}_L = \{f_m\}_L$ then $g = f_m$, and we can obtain f.

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$$\varphi_m: \mathbb{P}^1 \longrightarrow \mathbb{P}^1$$

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Computing $\{f_m\}_L$ from \mathcal{O}_f :

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Linear cost per sequence: L+1 oracle queries and L+1 Legendre symbol computations $\to 1$ Legendre sequence.

Amortised for all $m \in PGL_2(\mathbb{F}_p)$: p oracle queries and p Legendre symbols $\to (p^3 - p)$ Legendre sequences.

Precomputation

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What if oracle queries are limited?

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$$\begin{pmatrix} d & i \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot f = f_{i,d}(x) = f(dx+i)/d^r.$$


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
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$$\begin{pmatrix} f_{i,d}(x) \\ p \end{pmatrix} = \mathcal{O}_f(dx+i) \left(\frac{d}{p}\right)^r.$$


$$\{f\}_M \quad 0 \qquad M-1$$












Query \mathcal{O}_f at [0, M).



In total $\frac{M^2}{L}$ eligible (i, d) values.

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Expected run-time: $O(\frac{p^rL}{M^2})$ trials.

Khovratovich [Kho19]: Group G with d = 1. Table size: O(1).

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Algorithm	expected # trials	precomputation	memory
Khovratovich	<u>p log p</u> M	М	log p
Beullens et al.	<u>p log² p</u> M²	M^2	$\frac{M^2}{\log p}$
Our algorithm	<u>p log p</u> M²	$\frac{M^2}{\log p}$	M^2

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Algorithm	search	precomputation	memory
Khovratovich	$p^{r-1}r\log p$	r log p	r log p
Beullens et al.	$p^{r-2}r^2\log^2 p$	p^2	p^2
Our algorithm	$p^{r-3}r\log p$	$p^3 r \log p$	$p^3 r \log p$

Ethereum research challenges [Fei19]:

- 5 Linear Legendre PRF challenges

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- Given $M=2^{20}$ symbols of sequence $\{f\}_M$.
- Goal to find f = x + k.
- For each challenge we used L=64.
- Tables contained 2^{34} sequences.

- 5 Linear Legendre PRF challenges
- Primes p of 64, 74, 84, 100 and 148 bits
- Given $M=2^{20}$ symbols of sequence $\{f\}_M$.
- Goal to find f = x + k.
- For each challenge we used L=64.
- Tables contained 2³⁴ sequences.
- About 2.2e6 trials per core-second.

Results

Table 1: Results and estimates for solving the Legendre PRF challenges. In all cases $M=2^{20}$ consecutive queries are given.

Challenge	Prime	Expected	Observed	Expected	Observed
	bit size	# trials	# trials	core-hours	core-hours
0	64	2 ³⁰	230.78	290 sec	490 sec
1	74	2 ⁴⁰	2 ^{39.53}	82	59
2	84	2^{50}	2 ^{46.97}	1.4e5	1.72e4
3	100	2 ⁶⁶	-	9.1e9	-
4	148	2 ¹¹⁴	-	2.5e24	-

The end

Thank you for Your attention!

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