


# Keychat: Secure Messaging via Bitcoin

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Robert Chen, John Kuszmaul, Yiming Zheng  
Mentored By Alin Tomescu


# Motivation

- We want to secure communications.




# End-to-end Encryption

- People generate a key pair. They broadcast public keys.



# The Problem: Public Key Distribution

- People can encrypt messages, but they might be encrypting them for the wrong person.



# The Current State of Common Communications Apps

- Facebook Messenger, Gmail - Do not use end-to-end encryption by default
- WhatsApp, Signal - Public keys are stored in a central directory that may be insecure.



What is Bob's Public Key?

I know! It's  $PK_B$ .

Signal  
PKD



# Are append-only PKDs enough for security?

If append-only, then Bob can detect fake  $PK_M$

*What else can the malicious PKD do?*

## Public Key Directory

Name	Public Key
Alice	$PK_A$
Bob	$PK_B$

# Our Work: Public Key Directory Equivocation

Version 1

Name	Public Key
Alice	$PK_A$

Version 2A

Alice's Perspective

Name	Public Key
Alice	$PK_A$
Bob	$PK_M$

Version 2B

Bob's Perspective

Name	Public Key
Alice	$PK_A$
Bob	$PK_B$

# Outline

**Keybase**

Bitcoin

Catena

Keychat



Keybase

Witnesses

Optimizes



Catena



Bitcoin



# Keybase: A public key directory



Keybase PKD  
Server

$$S_1 = H(\text{DIR}_1)$$

Name	Public Key
John	$\text{PK}_J$
Robert	$\text{PK}_R$

$$S_2 = H(\text{DIR}_2)$$

Name	Public Key
John	$\text{PK}_J$
Robert	$\text{PK}_R$
Yiming	$\text{PK}_Y$

# Keybase Summaries

Keybase PKD  
Server



Yiming  
 $S_1$


(1) Yiming PK?



(2)  $PK_Y$



(3) Verify  $PK_Y$  against  $S_1$



Robert  
 $S_1$


(1) Yiming PK?



(2)  $PK_Y$



(3) Verify  $PK_Y$  against  $S_1$



# Keybase Equivocation

Keybase PKD Server

Yiming  
 $S_1, S_2$



(1) Yiming PK?



(2)  $PK_Y$



(3) Verify  $PK_Y$  against  $S_2$



(1) Yiming PK?



(2)  $PK_M$



(3) Verify  $PK_M$  against  $S_2'$



Robert  
 $S_1, S_2'$




# Keybase Non-equivocation

- Important that Yiming and Robert have the same history of hashes/summaries:  $S_1, S_2, S_3 \dots$

Keybase PKD  
Server



$S_1, S_2, S_3 \dots$



Bitcoin



Download  $S_1, S_2, S_3 \dots$



Robert's, Yiming's Keychat apps

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
# Bitcoin: Blockchain

## Block 1


A → B, 5 BTC

C → D, 10 BTC

# Bitcoin: Blockchain




# Bitcoin: Blockchain







# However, Can Forks Happen?




However, Can Forks Happen? Answer: **No!**



# Keybase “Witnessing” Summaries




# Equivocation Within a Block?




# Hashes: A Reminder

SHA 256  
(Hash Function)

# Hashes: A Reminder



# Hashes: A Reminder



# More Properties of Ideal Hash Functions

654324748



SHA 256  
(Hash Function)



'46f4e4edb6612295a20af8d92  
7b6416a59398091dd8260166  
8e441ac0bf26e2e'



Always 256 bits

Bitcoin block



SHA 256  
(Hash Function)




'b7a4c0d08a9f74f47ce44d1f7  
a58d9344b35aab00c1997582  
8ffb6fea556e6fa'



Always 256 bits



# More Properties of Ideal Hash Functions



## One Way (OW):


Given  $y$ , “infeasible” to find any  $x$  such that  $h(x) = y$ .

# Takeaways

- Can feed in any size data as input → fixed length output
- Randomness: Small change in input data → entirely different output
- One-way: Given a hash, can't feasibly find any data that hashes to it
- Perfect for a tamper-evident, append-only log!

# Blockchain: A Closer Look!


## Block 1



### **Block Header:**

- Contains hash pointer to TXN data
- Contains hash pointer to previous block


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# Blockchain: A Closer Look!




## Block Header:



- Contains hash pointer to TXN data
- Contains hash pointer to previous block

# Transactions: A Closer Look!

- Transactions stored in *Merkle Tree*
- *Merkle Root* hash stored in header





# Transactions: Membership Proof



**Membership proof** for  $tx_2$ ?


# Transactions: Membership Proof



**Membership proof** for  $tx_2$




# Transactions: Membership Proof




**Membership proof** for  $tx_2$

# Transactions: Membership Proof




**Membership proof** for  $tx_2$

# Transactions: Membership Proof




# Membership Proof Success

Yay!




Membership proof for  $tx_2$

# Transaction Format




- Merkle tree of TXNs in each block

# Transaction Format




- Transactions transfer coins

# Transaction Format



- Transactions transfer coins
- Output = # of coins and owner's PK
- Input "spends" previous output


# Transaction Format



Data can be embedded in TXNs.




# Transaction Format



Bob gives Carl 3B,

What happens if Bob tries to double spend?

# Transaction Format



**No double-spent coins:** A TXN output can only be referred to by a single TXN input.

# Outline

Keybase

Bitcoin

**Catena**

Keychat



Keybase

Witnesses

Optimizes




Catena



Bitcoin


# Problem with Keybase - Equivocation Within a Block?



Auditors must download the entire Bitcoin blockchain to check if any blocks contain invalid Keybase transactions


# Key idea behind Catena

Efficiently use Bitcoin's mechanism that prevents double spends as proof of non-equivocation.




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


# Catena



Linear chain of transactions containing statements


# Efficient auditing



Keybase server




# Efficient auditing




Keybase server

# Efficient auditing




Keybase  
server

# Efficient auditing




Keybase server


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


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


Keybase server

# Efficient auditing




# Efficient auditing



Keybase server




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


Keybase server


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


# Efficient auditing



Keybase server


# Auditing bandwidth



*e.g.*, **460K** block headers + **10K** statements = **~41 MB**  
(80 bytes each) (around 600 bytes each)


# Recap

- Keybase can equivocate, so they witness the directory in Bitcoin, but inefficiently



# Recap

- Keybase can equivocate, so they witness the directory in Bitcoin, but inefficiently
- Use Catena to make auditing the Keybase PKD more efficient



# Outline

Keybase

Bitcoin

Catena

**Keychat**




Keybase

Witnesses

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Bitcoin



# Keychat

- Uses the Keybase PKD, so users can communicate securely without fear of public key equivocation
- Implemented using Meteor, a Javascript framework that allows KeyChat to work as both a website and an Android app



# Next steps

- Implement Catena for Keybase using Java to efficiently witness the Keybase Public Key Directory in the Bitcoin blockchain
- Implement Keychat using Meteor



# Acknowledgements

Thanks to our mentor Alin Tomescu for his support and guidance!

Thanks to PRIMES for this opportunity!

Thanks to our parents for their support!

Thanks to all of you for being such a great audience!

Ask us questions!

