

10 Generic algorithms for the discrete logarithm problem

We now consider generic algorithms for the discrete logarithm problem in the standard setting of a cyclic group $\langle \alpha \rangle$. We shall assume throughout that $N = |\alpha|$ is known. This is a reasonable assumption: in cryptographic applications it is quite important to know N (or at least to know that N is prime) and the problem of computing N is known to be strictly easier than the discrete logarithm problem [10].

The cyclic group $\langle \alpha \rangle$ is isomorphic to the additive group $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. For generic group algorithms we may as well assume $\langle \alpha \rangle$ is $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, generated by $\alpha = 1$, since every cyclic group of order N looks the same when it is hidden in a black box. Of course with the black box picking arbitrary group identifiers in $\{0, 1\}^m$, we cannot actually tell which integer x in $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ corresponds to a particular group element β ; indeed, x is precisely the discrete logarithm of β that we wish to compute! Thus computing discrete logarithms amounts to explicitly computing the isomorphism from $\langle \alpha \rangle$ to $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ that sends α to 1. Computing the isomorphism in the reverse direction is easy: this is just exponentiation. Thus we have (in multiplicative notation):

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \alpha \rangle &\simeq \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \\ \beta &\rightarrow \log_{\alpha} \beta \\ \alpha^x &\leftarrow x \end{aligned}$$

Cryptographic applications of the discrete logarithm problem rely on the fact that it is easy to compute $\beta = \alpha^x$ but hard (in general) to compute $x = \log_{\alpha} \beta$. In order to simplify our notation we will write the group operation additively, so that $\beta = x\alpha$.

10.1 Linear search

Starting from α , compute

$$\alpha, 2\alpha, 3\alpha, \dots, x\alpha = \beta,$$

and then output x (or if we reach $N\alpha$, report that $\beta \notin \langle \alpha \rangle$). This uses at most N group operations, and the average over all inputs is $N/2$ group operations.

We mention this algorithm only for the sake of comparison. Its time complexity is not attractive, but we note that its space complexity is $O(1)$ group elements.

10.2 Baby-steps giant-steps

Pick positive integers r and s such that $rs > N$, and then compute:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{baby steps: } & 0, \alpha, 2\alpha, 3\alpha, \dots, (r-1)\alpha, \\ \text{giant steps: } & \beta, \beta - r\alpha, \beta - 2r\alpha, \dots, \beta - (s-1)r\alpha, \end{aligned}$$

A collision occurs when we find a baby step that is equal to a giant step. We then have

$$i\alpha = \beta - jr\alpha,$$

for some nonnegative integers $i < r$ and $j < s$. If $i = j = 0$, then β is the identity and $\log_{\alpha} \beta = N$. Otherwise,

$$\log_{\alpha} \beta = i + jr.$$

Typically the baby steps are stored in a lookup table, allowing us to check for a collision as each giant step is computed, so we don't necessarily need to compute all the giant steps. We can easily detect $\beta \notin \langle \alpha \rangle$, since every integer in $[1, N]$ can be written in the form $i + jr$ with $0 \leq i < r$ and $0 \leq j < s$. If we do not find a collision, then $\beta \notin \langle \alpha \rangle$.

The baby-steps giant-steps algorithm uses $r + s$ group operations, which is $O(\sqrt{N})$ if we choose $r \approx s \approx \sqrt{N}$. It requires space for r group elements (the baby steps), which is also $O(\sqrt{N})$ but can be made smaller if are willing to increase the running time by making s larger; there is thus a time-space trade-off we can make, but the product of the time and space complexity is always $\Omega(N)$.

The two algorithms above are insensitive to any special properties of N , their complexities depend only on its approximate size. In fact, if we assume that $\beta \in \langle \alpha \rangle$ then we do not even need to know what N : this is clear for the linear search, and for the baby-steps giant-steps method we could simply start with $N = 2$ and repeatedly double it until we succeed, which would still yield an $O(\sqrt{N})$ complexity.¹

For the next algorithm we consider it is quite important to know N exactly, in fact we will assume that we know its prime factorization; factoring N does not require any group operations, so in fact a generic algorithm is allowed to factor N "for free". In any case, there are many algorithms to factor N that are much faster than the generic lower bound we will prove below; as we will see in the next lecture, the elliptic curve factorization method is one such algorithm.

10.3 The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm

We now introduce the Pohlig-Hellman² algorithm, a recursive method to reduce the discrete logarithm problem in cyclic groups of composite order to discrete logarithm problems in cyclic groups of prime order.

We first reduce to the prime power case. Suppose $N = N_1 N_2$ with $N_1 \perp N_2$. Then $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \simeq \mathbb{Z}/N_1\mathbb{Z} \oplus \mathbb{Z}/N_2\mathbb{Z}$, by the Chinese remainder theorem, and we can make this isomorphism completely explicit via

$$\begin{array}{ccc} x & \rightarrow & (x \bmod N_1, x \bmod N_2), \\ (M_1 x_1 + M_2 x_2) \bmod N & \leftarrow & (x_1, x_2), \end{array}$$

where

$$M_1 = N_2(N_2^{-1} \bmod N_1) \equiv \begin{cases} 1 \bmod N_1, \\ 0 \bmod N_2, \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

$$M_2 = N_1(N_1^{-1} \bmod N_2) \equiv \begin{cases} 0 \bmod N_1, \\ 1 \bmod N_2. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

Note that computing M_i and N_i does not involve group operations and is independent of β ; with the fast Euclidean algorithm the time to compute M_1 and M_2 is $O(M(n) \log n)$ bit operations, where $n = \log N$.

Let us now consider the computation of $x = \log_\alpha \beta$. Define

$$x_1 := x \bmod N_1 \quad \text{and} \quad x_2 := x \bmod N_2,$$

¹There are more efficient ways to do an unbounded baby-steps giant-steps search, see [10, 12].

²The article by Pohlig and Hellman [5] notes that essentially equivalent versions of the algorithm were independently found by R. Silver, and by R. Schroepel and H. Block, none of whom published the result.

so that $x = M_1x_1 + M_2x_2$, and

$$\beta = (M_1x_1 + M_2x_2)\alpha.$$

Multiplying both sides by N_2 and distributing the scalar multiplication yields

$$N_2\beta = M_1x_1N_2\alpha + M_2x_2N_2\alpha. \quad (3)$$

As you proved in Problem Set 1, the order of $N_2\alpha$ is N_1 (since $N_1 \perp N_2$). From (1) and (2) we have $M_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{N_1}$ and $M_2 \equiv 0 \pmod{N_1}$, so the second term in (3) vanishes and the first can be simplified to obtain

$$N_2\beta = x_1N_2\alpha.$$

We similarly find that $N_1\beta = x_2N_1\alpha$. Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} x_1 &= \log_{N_2\alpha} N_2\beta, \\ x_2 &= \log_{N_1\alpha} N_1\beta. \end{aligned}$$

If we know x_1 and x_2 then we can compute $x = (M_1x_1 + M_2x_2) \pmod{N}$. Thus the computation of $x = \log_\alpha \beta$ can be reduced to the computation of $x_1 = \log_{N_2\alpha} N_2\beta$ and $x_2 = \log_{N_1\alpha} N_1\beta$. If N is prime this doesn't help (either $N_1 = N$ or $N_2 = N$), but otherwise these two discrete logarithms involve groups of smaller order. In the best case $N_1 \approx N_2$, and we reduce our original problem to two subproblems of half the size, and this reduction involves only $O(n)$ group operations (the time to compute $N_1\alpha, N_1\beta, N_2\alpha, N_2\beta$ using double-and-add scalar multiplication).

By applying the reduction above recursively, we can reduce this to the case where N is a prime power p^e , which we now assume. Let $e_0 = \lceil e/2 \rceil$ and $e_1 = \lfloor e/2 \rfloor$. We may write $x = \log_\alpha \beta$ in the form $x = x_0 + p^{e_0}x_1$, with $0 \leq x_0 < p^{e_0}$ and $0 \leq x_1 < p^{e_1}$. We then have

$$\begin{aligned} \beta &= (x_0 + p^{e_0}x_1)\alpha, \\ p^{e_1}\beta &= x_0p^{e_1}\alpha + x_1p^e\alpha. \end{aligned}$$

The second term in the last equation is zero, since α has order $N = p^e$, so

$$x_0 = \log_{p^{e_1}\alpha} p^{e_1}\beta.$$

We also have $\beta - x_0\alpha = p^{e_0}x_1\alpha$, therefore

$$x_1 = \log_{p^{e_0}\alpha} (\beta - x_0\alpha).$$

If N is not prime, this again reduces the computation of $\log_\alpha \beta$ to the computation of two smaller discrete logarithms (of roughly equal size) using $O(n)$ group operations.

The Pohlig-Hellman method [5] recursively applies the two reductions above to reduce the problem to a set of discrete logarithm computations in groups of prime order.³ For these computations we must revert to some other method, such as baby-steps giant-steps (or Pollard-rho, which we will see shortly). When N is a prime p , the complexity is then $O(\sqrt{p})$ group operations.

³The original algorithm of Pohlig and Hellman actually used an iterative approach that is not as fast as the recursive approach suggested here. The recursive approach for the prime-power case that we use here appears in [8, §11.2.3]. When $N = p^e$ is a power of a prime $p = O(1)$, the complexity of the original Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is $O(n^2)$, versus the $O(n \log n)$ bound we obtain here (this can be further improved to $O(n \log n / \log \log n)$ via [11]).

10.4 Complexity analysis

Let $N = p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_r^{e_r}$ be the prime factorization of N . Reducing to the prime-power case involves at most $\lg r = O(\log n)$ levels of recursion, where $n = \log N$ (in fact the prime number theorem implies $\lg r = O(\log n / \log \log n)$, but we won't use this). The exponents e_i are all bounded by $\lg N = O(n)$, thus reducing prime powers to the prime case involves at most an additional $O(\log n)$ levels of recursion, since the exponents are reduced by roughly a factor of 2 at each level.

The total depth of the recursion tree is thus $O(\log n)$. Note that we do not need to assume anything about the prime factorization of N in order to obtain this bound; in particular, even if the prime powers $p_i^{e_i}$ vary widely in size, this bound still holds.

The product of the orders of the bases used at any given level of the recursion tree is always equal to N . The number of group operations required at each internal node of the recursion tree is linear in the bit-size of the order of the base, since only $O(1)$ scalar multiplications are used in each recursive step. Thus if we exclude the primes order cases at the leaves, every layer of the recursion tree uses $O(n)$ group operations. If we use the baby-steps giant-steps algorithm to handle the prime order cases, each leaf uses $O(\sqrt{p_i})$ group operations and the total running time is

$$O\left(n \log n + \sum e_i \sqrt{p_i}\right)$$

group operations, where the sum is over the distinct prime divisors p_i of N . We can also bound this by

$$O(n \log n + n\sqrt{p}),$$

where p is the largest prime dividing N . The space complexity is $O(\sqrt{p})$ group elements, assuming we use a baby-steps giant-steps search for the prime cases; this can be reduced to $O(1)$ using the Pollard-rho method (which is the next algorithm we will consider), but this results in a probabilistic (Las Vegas) algorithm, whereas the basic Pohlig-Hellman approach is completely deterministic.

The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm can be extremely efficient when N is composite; if N is sufficiently smooth its running time is quasi-linear in $n = \log N$, essentially the same as for exponentiation. Thus it is quite important to use groups of prime (or near-prime) order in cryptographic applications of the discrete logarithm problem. This is one of the motivations for efficient point-counting algorithms for elliptic curves: we really need to know the exact group order before we can consider a group suitable for cryptographic use.

10.5 Randomized algorithms for the discrete logarithm problem

So far we have only considered deterministic algorithms for the discrete logarithm problem. We now want to consider probabilistic methods. Randomization will not allow us to achieve a better time complexity (a fact we will prove shortly), but we can achieve a much better space complexity. This also makes it much easier to parallelize the algorithm, which is crucial for large-scale computations (one can construct a parallel version of the baby-steps giant-steps algorithm, but detecting collisions is more complicated and requires a lot of communication).

10.5.1 The birthday paradox

Recall what the so-called *birthday paradox* tells us about collision frequency: if we drop $\Omega(\sqrt{N})$ balls randomly into $O(N)$ bins then the probability that some bin contains more

than one ball is bounded below by some nonzero constant that we can make arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the number of balls by a constant factor. Given $\beta \in \langle \alpha \rangle$, the baby-steps giant-steps method for computing $\log_\alpha \beta$ can be viewed as dropping $\sqrt{2N}$ balls corresponding to linear combinations of α and β into N bins corresponding to the elements of $\langle \alpha \rangle$. Of course these balls are not dropped randomly, they are dropped in a pattern that guarantees a collision.

But if we instead computed $\sqrt{2N}$ random linear combinations of α and β , we would still have a good chance of finding a collision (better than 50/50, in fact). The main problem with this approach is that in order to find the collision we would still need to keep a record of all the linear combinations we have computed, which takes space. In order to take advantage of the birthday paradox in a way that uses less space we need to be a bit more clever.

10.5.2 Random walks on a graph

Let us now view the group $G = \langle \alpha \rangle$ as the vertex set V of a connected graph Γ whose edges $e_{ij} = (\gamma_i, \gamma_j)$ are labeled with the group element $\delta_{ij} = \gamma_j - \gamma_i$ satisfying $\gamma_i + \delta_{ij} = \gamma_j$ (a Cayley graph, for example). If we know how to express each δ_{ij} as a linear combination of α and $\beta \in \langle \alpha \rangle$ then any cycle in Γ yields a linear relation involving α and β . Provided the coefficient of β is invertible modulo $N = |\alpha|$, we can use this relation to compute $\log_\alpha \beta$.

Suppose we use a random function $f: V \rightarrow V$ to construct a walk from a random starting point $v_0 \in V$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} v_1 &= f(v_0) \\ v_2 &= f(v_1) \\ v_3 &= f(v_2) \\ &\vdots \end{aligned}$$

Since f is a function, if we ever repeat a vertex, say $v_\rho = v_\lambda$ for some $\rho > \lambda$, we will be permanently stuck in a cycle, since we then have $f(v_{\rho+i}) = f(v_{\lambda+i})$ for all $i \geq 0$. Note that V is finite, so this must happen eventually.

Our random walk consists of two parts, a path from v_0 to the vertex v_λ , the first vertex that is visited more than once, and a cycle consisting of the vertices $v_\lambda, v_{\lambda+1}, \dots, v_{\rho-1}$. This can be visualized as a path in the shape of the Greek letter ρ , which explains the name of the ρ -method we wish to consider.

In order to extract information from this cycle we will need to augment function f so that we can associate linear combinations $a\alpha + b\beta$ to each edge in the cycle. But let us first compute the expected number of steps a random walk takes to reach its first collision.

Theorem 10.1. *Let V be a finite set. For any $v_0 \in V$, the expected value of ρ for a walk from v_0 defined by a random function $f: V \rightarrow V$ is*

$$\mathbb{E}[\rho] \sim \sqrt{\pi N/2},$$

as the cardinality N of V tends to infinity.

This theorem was stated in lecture without proof; here give an elementary proof.

Proof. Let $P_n = \Pr[\rho > n]$. We have $P_0 = 1$ and $P_1 = (1 - 1/N)$, and in general

$$P_n = \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right) = \prod_{i=1}^n \left(1 - \frac{i}{N}\right)$$

for any $n < N$ (and $P_n = 0$ for $n \geq N$). We compute the expectation of ρ as

$$\begin{aligned}
 E[\rho] &= \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} n \cdot \Pr[\rho = n] \\
 &= \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} n \cdot (P_{n-1} - P_n), \\
 &= 1(P_0 - P_1) + 2(P_1 - P_2) + \dots + n(P_{n-1} - P_n) \\
 &= \sum_{n=0}^{N-1} P_n - nP_n. \tag{4}
 \end{aligned}$$

In order to determine the asymptotic behavior of $E[\rho]$ we need tight bounds on P_n . Using the fact that $\log(1-x) < -x$ for $0 < x < 1$, we obtain an upper bound on P_n :

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_n &= \exp\left(\sum_{i=1}^n \log\left(1 - \frac{i}{N}\right)\right) \\
 &< \exp\left(-\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^n i\right) \\
 &< \exp\left(\frac{-n^2}{2N}\right).
 \end{aligned}$$

To establish a lower bound, we use the fact that $\log(1-x) > -x - x^2$ for $0 < x < \frac{1}{2}$, which can be verified using the Taylor series expansion for $\log(1-x)$.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_n &= \exp\left(\sum_{i=1}^n \log\left(1 - \frac{i}{N}\right)\right) \\
 &> \exp\left(-\sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{i}{N} + \frac{i^2}{N^2}\right)\right).
 \end{aligned}$$

We now let $M = N^{3/5}$ and assume $n < M$. In this range we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{i}{N} + \frac{i^2}{N^2}\right) &< \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\frac{i}{N} + N^{-\frac{4}{5}}\right) \\
 &< \frac{n^2 + n}{2N} + N^{-\frac{1}{5}} \\
 &< \frac{n^2}{2N} + \frac{1}{2}N^{-\frac{2}{5}} + N^{-\frac{1}{5}} \\
 &< \frac{n^2}{2N} + 2N^{-\frac{1}{5}},
 \end{aligned}$$

which implies

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_n &> \exp\left(\frac{-n^2}{2N}\right) \exp\left(-2N^{-\frac{1}{5}}\right) \\
 &= (1 + o(1)) \exp\left(\frac{-n^2}{2N}\right).
 \end{aligned}$$

We now return to the computation of $E[\rho]$. From (4) we have

$$E[\rho] = \sum_{n=0}^{\lfloor M \rfloor} P_n + \sum_{n=\lceil M \rceil}^{N-1} P_n + o(1) \quad (5)$$

where the error term comes from $nP_n < n \exp(-\frac{n^2}{2N}) = o(1)$ (we use $o(1)$ to denote any term whose absolute value tends to 0 as $N \rightarrow \infty$). The second sum is negligible, since

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{n=\lceil M \rceil}^{N-1} P_n &< N \exp\left(-\frac{M^2}{2N}\right) \\ &= N \exp\left(-\frac{1}{2}N^{-\frac{1}{5}}\right) \\ &= o(1). \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

For the first sum we have

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{n=0}^{\lfloor M \rfloor} P_n &= \sum_{n=0}^{\lfloor M \rfloor} (1 + o(1)) \exp\left(-\frac{n^2}{2N}\right) \\ &= (1 + o(1)) \int_0^\infty e^{-\frac{x^2}{2N}} dx + O(1) \\ &= (1 + o(1)) \sqrt{2N} \int_0^\infty e^{-u^2} du + O(1) \\ &= (1 + o(1)) \sqrt{2N} (\sqrt{\pi}/2) \\ &= (1 + o(1)) \sqrt{\pi N/2}. \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Plugging (6) and (7) in to (5) yields the desired result. \square

Remark 10.2. One can similarly show $E[\lambda] = E[\sigma] = \frac{1}{2}E[\rho] = \sqrt{\pi N/8}$, where $\sigma = \rho - \lambda$ is the length of the cycle.

In the baby-steps giant-steps algorithm (BSGS), if we assume that the discrete logarithm is uniformly distributed over $[1, N]$, then we should use $\sqrt{N/2}$ baby steps and expect to find the discrete logarithm after $\sqrt{N/2}$ giant steps, on average, using a total of $\sqrt{2N}$ group operations. But note that $\sqrt{\pi}/2 \approx 1.25$ is less than $\sqrt{2} \approx 1.41$, so we may hope to compute discrete logarithms slightly faster than BSGS (on average) by simulating a random walk. Of course the worst-case running time for BSGS is better, since we will never need more than $\sqrt{2N}$ giant steps, but with a random walk the (very unlikely) worst case is N steps.

10.6 Pollard- ρ Algorithm

We now present the Pollard- ρ algorithm for computing $\log_\alpha \beta$, given $\beta \in \langle \alpha \rangle$; we should note that the assumption $\beta \in \langle \alpha \rangle$ which was not necessary in the baby-steps giant-steps algorithm is crucial here. As noted earlier, finding a collision in a random walk is useful to us only if we know how to express the colliding group elements as independent linear combinations of α and β . We thus extend the function $f: G \rightarrow G$ used to define our random walk to a function

$$f: \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \times G \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \times G,$$

which we require to have the property that if the input (a, b, γ) satisfies $a\alpha + b\beta = \gamma$, then $(a', b', \gamma') = f(a, b, \gamma)$ should satisfy $a'\alpha + b'\beta = \gamma'$.

There are several ways to define such a function f , one of which is the following. We first fix r distinct group elements $\delta_i = c_i\alpha + d_i\beta$ for some randomly chosen $c_i, d_i \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. In order to simulate a random walk, we don't want r to be too small: empirically $r \approx 20$ works well [13]. We then define $f(a, b, \gamma) = (a + c_i, b + d_i, \gamma + \delta_i)$, where $i = h(\gamma)$ is determined by a randomly chosen *hash function*

$$h: G \rightarrow \{1, \dots, r\}.$$

In practice we don't choose h randomly, we just need the preimages $h^{-1}(i)$ to partition G into r subsets of roughly equal size; for example, we might take the integer whose base-2 representation corresponds to the identifier $\text{id}(\gamma) \in \{0, 1\}^m$ and reduce it modulo r .⁴

To start our random walk, we pick random $a_0, b_0 \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ and let $\gamma_0 = a_0\alpha + b_0\beta$. The walk defined by the iteration function f is known as an *r-adding* walk. Note that if $(a_{j+1}, b_{j+1}, \gamma_{j+1}) = f(a_j, b_j, \gamma_j)$, the value of γ_{j+1} depends only on γ_j , not on a_j or b_j , so the function f does define a walk in the same sense as before. We now give the algorithm.

Algorithm 10.3 (Pollard- ρ). Given α , $N = |\alpha|$, $\beta \in \langle \alpha \rangle$, compute $\log_\alpha \beta$ as follows:

1. Compute $\delta_i = c_i\alpha + d_i\beta$ for $r \approx 20$ randomly chosen pairs $c_i, d_i \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.
2. Compute $\gamma_0 = a_0\alpha + b_0\beta$ for randomly chosen $a_0, b_0 \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$.
3. Compute $(a_j, b_j, \gamma_j) = f(a_{j-1}, b_{j-1}, \gamma_{j-1})$ for $j = 1, 2, 3, \dots$, until $\gamma_k = \gamma_j$ with $k > j$.
4. The collision $\gamma_k = \gamma_j$ implies $a_j\alpha + b_j\beta = a_k\alpha + b_k\beta$. Provided that $b_k - b_j$ is invertible in $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, we return $\log_\alpha \beta = \frac{a_j - a_k}{b_k - b_j} \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$; otherwise start over at step 1.

Note that if $N = |\alpha|$ is a large prime, it is extremely likely that $b_k - b_j$ will be invertible. In any case, by restarting we ensure that the algorithm terminates with probability 1, since it is certainly possible to have $\gamma_0 = x\alpha$ and $\gamma_1 = \beta$, where $x = \log_\alpha \beta$, for example. With this implementation the Pollard rho algorithm is a Las Vegas algorithm, even though it is often referred to in the literature as a Monte Carlo algorithm, due to the title of [7].

The description above does not specify how we should detect collisions. A simple method is to store all the γ_j as they are computed and look for a collision during each iteration. However, this implies a space complexity of ρ , which we expect to be on the order of \sqrt{N} . But we can use dramatically less space than this.

The key point is that once the walk enters a cycle, it will remain inside this cycle forever, and *every* step inside the cycle produces a collision. It is thus not necessary to detect a collision at the exact moment we enter the cycle, we can afford a slight delay. We now consider two space-efficient methods for doing this.

10.7 Floyd's cycle detection method

Floyd's cycle detection method [4, p. 4] minimizes the space required: it keeps track of just two triples (a_j, b_j, γ_j) and (a_k, b_k, γ_k) that correspond to vertices of the walk (of course it also needs to store c_i, d_i, γ_i for $0 \leq i < r$). The method is typically described in terms of a tortoise and a hare that are both traveling along the ρ -shaped walk. They start with the

⁴Note the importance of unique identifiers. We must be sure that γ is always hashed to the same value. Using a non-unique representation such as projective points on an elliptic curve will not achieve this.

same γ_0 , but in each iteration the hare takes two steps, while the tortoise takes just one. We thus modify step 3 of Algorithm 10.3 to compute

$$\begin{aligned}(a_j, b_j, \gamma_j) &= f(a_{j-1}, b_{j-1}, \gamma_{j-1}) \\ (a_k, b_k, \gamma_k) &= f(f(a_{k-1}, b_{k-1}, \gamma_{k-1})).\end{aligned}$$

The triple (a_j, b_j, γ_j) corresponds to the tortoise, and the triple (a_k, b_k, γ_k) corresponds to the hare. Once the tortoise enters the cycle, the hare (which must already be in the cycle) is guaranteed to collide with the tortoise within $\sigma/2$ iterations, where σ is the length of the cycle (to see this, note that the hare cannot pass the tortoise without landing on it). On average, we expect it to take $\sigma/4$ iterations for the hare to catch the tortoise and produce a collision, which we detect by testing whether $\gamma_j = \gamma_k$ after each iteration.

The expected number of iterations is thus $E[\lambda + \sigma/4] = 5/8 E[\rho]$. But each iteration now requires three group operations, so the algorithm is actually slower by a factor of $15/8$. Still, this achieves a time complexity of $O(\sqrt{N})$ group operations while storing just $O(1)$ group elements, which is a dramatic improvement.

10.8 The method of distinguished points

The “distinguished points” method (commonly attributed to Ron Rivest) uses slightly more space, say $O(\log^c N)$ group elements, for some constant c , but it detects cycles in essentially optimal time (within a factor of $1 + o(1)$ of the best possible), and uses just one group operation in each iteration.

The idea is to “distinguish” a certain subset of G by fixing a random boolean function $B: G \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and calling the elements of $B^{-1}(1)$ *distinguished points*. We don’t want the set of distinguished points to be too large, since we will store all the distinguished we encounter during our walk, but we want our walk to contain many distinguished points; say $(\log N)^c$, on average, for some constant $c > 0$. This means we should choose B so that

$$\#B^{-1}(1) \approx \sqrt{N}(\log N)^c.$$

One way to define such a function B is to hash group elements to bit-strings of length k via a hash function $\tilde{h}: G \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, and then let $B(\gamma) = 1$ if and only if $\tilde{h}(\gamma)$ is the zero vector. If we set $k = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 N - c \log_2 \log N$ then $B^{-1}(1)$ will have the desired cardinality. An easy and very efficient way to construct the hash function \tilde{h} is to use the k least significant bits of the bit-string that uniquely represents the group element. For points on elliptic curves, we should use bits from the x -coordinate, since this will allow us to detect collisions of the form $\gamma_j = \pm\gamma_k$ (we can determine the sign by checking y -coordinates).

Algorithm 10.4 (Pollard- ρ using distinguished points).

1. Pick random $c_i, d_i, a_0, b_0 \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, compute $\delta_i = c_i\alpha + d_i\beta$ and $\gamma_0 = a_0\alpha + b_0\beta$, and initialize $D \leftarrow \emptyset$.
2. For $j = 1, 2, 3, \dots$:
 - a. Compute $(a_j, b_j, \gamma_j) = f(a_{j-1}, b_{j-1}, \gamma_{j-1})$.
 - b. If $B(\gamma_j) = 1$ then
 - i. If there exists $(a_k, b_k, \gamma_k) \in D$ with $\gamma_j = \gamma_k$ then return $\log_\alpha \beta = \frac{a_j - a_k}{b_k - b_j}$ if $\gcd(b_k - b_j, N) = 1$ and restart at step 1 otherwise.
 - ii. If not, replace D by $D \cup \{(a_j, b_j, \gamma_j)\}$ and continue.

A key feature of the distinguished points method is that it is very well-suited to a parallel implementation, which is critical for any large-scale discrete logarithm computation. Suppose we have many processors all running the same algorithm independently. If we have, say, \sqrt{N} processors, then after just one step there is a good chance of a collision, and in general if we have m processors we expect to get a collision within $O(\sqrt{N}/m)$ steps. We can detect this collision as soon as the processors involved in the collision reach a distinguished point. However, the individual processors cannot realize this themselves, since they only know the distinguished points they have seen, not those seen by other processors. Whenever a processor encounters a distinguished point, it sends the corresponding triple to a central server that is responsible for detecting collisions. This scenario is also called a λ -search, since the collision typically occurs between paths with different starting points that then follow the same trajectory (forming the shape of the letter λ , rather than the letter ρ).

There is one important detail that must be addressed: if there are no distinguished points in the cycle then Algorithm 10.4 will never terminate!

The solution is to let the distinguished set S grow with time. We begin with $S = \tilde{h}^{-1}(\mathbf{0})$, where $\tilde{h}: G \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ with $k = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 N - c \log_2 \log N$. Every $\sqrt{\pi N/2}$ iterations, we decrease k by 1. This effectively doubles the number of distinguished points, and when k reaches zero we consider every point to be distinguished. This guarantees termination, and the expected space is still just $O(\log^c N)$ group elements.

10.9 Current ECDLP records

The most recent record for computing discrete logarithms on elliptic curves over finite fields involves a cyclic group with 117-bit prime order on an elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_q with $q = 2^{127}$. This was announced just last year and used a parallel Pollard-rho search with a variant of the distinguished points method for collision detection. The computation was run on 576 XC6SLX150 FPGAs and took about 6.5 months [1]. The record for elliptic curves over prime fields was set in 2009 using a slightly smaller group of 112-bit prime order on an elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_p with $p = (2^{128} - 3)/(11 \cdot 6949)$. It also used a parallel Pollard-rho search running on a cluster of 200 PlayStation 3 game consoles and took about 6 months [3].

10.10 A generic lower bound for the discrete logarithm problem

We will now prove an essentially tight lower bound for solving the discrete logarithm problem with a generic group algorithm. We will show that if p is the largest prime divisor of N , then any generic group algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem must use $\Omega(\sqrt{p})$ group operations. In the case that the group order $N = p$ is prime this bound is tight, since we have already seen that the problem can be solved with $O(\sqrt{N})$ group operations using the baby-steps giant-steps method, and the Pohlig-Hellman complexity bound $O(n \log n + n\sqrt{p})$ shows that it is tight in general, up to logarithmic factors.

This lower bound applies not only to deterministic algorithms, but also to randomized algorithms: a generic Monte Carlo algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem must use $\Omega(\sqrt{p})$ group operations in order to be correct with probability bounded above 1/2, and the expected running time of any generic Las Vegas algorithm is $\Omega(\sqrt{p})$ group operations.

The following theorem due to Shoup [9] generalizes an earlier result of Nechaev [6]. Our presentation here differs slightly from Shoup's and gives a sharper bound, but the proof is essentially the same. Recall that in our generic group model, each group element is uniquely represented as a bit-string via an injective map $\text{id}: G \hookrightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$, where $m = O(\log |G|)$.

Theorem 10.5 (Shoup). *Let $G = \langle \alpha \rangle$ be group of order N . Let \mathcal{B} be a black box for G supporting the operations `identity`, `inverse`, and `compose`, using a random identification map $\text{id}: G \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$. Let $\mathcal{A}: \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ be a randomized generic group algorithm that makes at most $s - 4\lceil \lg N \rceil$ calls to \mathcal{B} , for some integer s , and let x denote a random element of $\mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$. Then*

$$\Pr_{x, \text{id}, \tau} [\mathcal{A}(\text{id}(\alpha), \text{id}(x\alpha)) = x] < \frac{s^2}{2p},$$

where τ denotes the random coin-flips made by \mathcal{A} and p is the largest prime factor of N .

Note that \mathcal{A} can generate random elements of G by computing $z\alpha$ for random $z \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ (using at most $2\lg N$ group operations). We assume that \mathcal{A} is given the group order N (this only makes the theorem stronger). The theorem includes deterministic algorithms as a special case where \mathcal{A} does not use any of the random bits in τ . Bounding the number of calls \mathcal{A} makes to \mathcal{B} might appear to make the theorem inapplicable to Las Vegas algorithms, but we can convert a Las Vegas algorithm to a Monte Carlo algorithm by forcing it halt and generate a random output if it exceeds its expected running time by some constant factor.

Proof. To simplify the proof, we will replace \mathcal{A} by an algorithm \mathcal{A}' that does the following:

1. Use \mathcal{B} to compute $\text{id}(N\alpha) = \text{id}(0)$.
2. Simulate \mathcal{A} , using $\text{id}(0)$ to replace `identity` operations, to get $y = \mathcal{A}(\text{id}(\alpha), \text{id}(x\alpha))$.
3. Use \mathcal{B} to compute $\text{id}(y\alpha)$.

In the description above we assume that the inputs to \mathcal{A} are $\text{id}(\alpha)$ and $\text{id}(x\alpha)$; the behavior of \mathcal{A}' when this is not the case is irrelevant. Note that steps 1 and 3 each require at most $2\lceil \log_2 N \rceil - 1$ calls to \mathcal{B} using double-and-add, so \mathcal{A}' makes at most $s - 2$ calls to \mathcal{B} .

Let $\gamma_1 = \text{id}(\alpha)$ and $\gamma_2 = \text{id}(x\alpha)$. Without loss of generality we may assume that every interaction between \mathcal{A}' and \mathcal{B} is of the form $\gamma_k = \gamma_i \pm \gamma_j$, with $1 \leq i, j < k$, where γ_i and γ_j are identifiers of group elements that are either inputs or values previously returned by \mathcal{B} (here the notation $\gamma_i \pm \gamma_j$ means that \mathcal{A}' is using \mathcal{B} to add or subtract the group elements identified by γ_i and γ_j). Note that \mathcal{A}' can invert γ_j by computing $\text{id}(0) - \gamma_j$.

The number of such interactions is clearly a lower bound on the number of calls made by \mathcal{A}' to \mathcal{B} . To further simplify matters, we will assume that the execution of \mathcal{A}' is padded with operations of the form $\gamma_k = \gamma_1 + \gamma_1$ as required until k reaches s .

Let $N = p^e M$ with $p \perp M$. For $k = 1, \dots, s$ define $F_k = a_k X + b_k \in \mathbb{Z}/p^e \mathbb{Z}[X]$ via:

$$F_1 := 1, \quad F_2 := X, \quad F_k := F_i \pm F_j \quad (2 < k \leq s),$$

where $\gamma_k = \gamma_i \pm \gamma_j$ (with the same sign), and similarly define $z_k \in \mathbb{Z}/M\mathbb{Z}$ via

$$z_1 := 1, \quad z_2 := x \bmod M, \quad z_k := z_i \pm z_j \quad (2 < k \leq s).$$

Each F_k is a linear polynomial in X that satisfies

$$F_k(x) \equiv \log_{\gamma_1} \gamma_k \bmod p^e,$$

and we also have $z_k = \log_{\gamma_1} \gamma_k \bmod M$ (here we are abusing notation by using $\gamma_k = \text{id}(g_k)$ to denote the group element $g_k \in G$ it represents).

Let us now consider the following game, which models the execution of \mathcal{A}' . At the start of the game we set $F_1 = 1$, $F_2 = X$, $z_1 = 1$, and set z_2 to a random element of $\mathbb{Z}/M\mathbb{Z}$. We also set γ_1 and γ_2 to distinct random values in $\{0, 1\}^m$. For rounds $k = 2, 3, \dots, s$, the algorithm \mathcal{A}' and the black box \mathcal{B} play the game as follows:

1. \mathcal{A}' chooses a pair of integers i and j , with $1 \leq i, j < k$, and a sign \pm that determines $F_k = F_i \pm F_j$ and $z_k = z_i \pm z_j$, and then asks \mathcal{B} for the value of $\gamma_k = \gamma_i \pm \gamma_j$.
2. \mathcal{B} sets $\gamma_k = \gamma_\ell$ if $F_k = F_\ell$ and $z_k = z_\ell$ for some $\ell < k$, and otherwise \mathcal{B} sets γ_k to a random bit-string in $\{0, 1\}^m$ that is distinct from γ_ℓ for all $\ell < k$.

After the s th round we pick $t \in \mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z}$ at random and say that \mathcal{A}' wins if $F_i(t) = F_j(t)$ for any $F_i \neq F_j$; otherwise \mathcal{B} wins. Notice that the group G also plays no role in the game, it just involves bit-strings, but the constraints on \mathcal{B} 's choice of γ_k ensure that the bit strings $\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_s$ can be assigned to group elements in a consistent way. We now claim that

$$\Pr_{x, \text{id}, \tau} [\mathcal{A}(\text{id}(\alpha), \text{id}(x\alpha)) = x] \leq \Pr_{t, \text{id}, \tau} [\mathcal{A}' \text{ wins the game}], \quad (8)$$

where the id function on the right represents an injective map $G \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ that is compatible with the choices made by \mathcal{B} during the game, i.e. there exists a sequence of group elements $\alpha = \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \dots, \alpha_s$ such that $\text{id}(\alpha_i) = \gamma_i$ and $\alpha_k = \alpha_i \pm \alpha_j$, where i, j , and the sign \pm correspond to the values chosen by \mathcal{A}' in the k th round.

For every value of x , id , and τ for which $\mathcal{A}(\text{id}(\alpha), \text{id}(x\alpha)) = x$, there is a value of t , namely $t = x \bmod p^e$, for which \mathcal{A}' wins the game (here we use the fact that \mathcal{A}' always computes $y\alpha$, where $y = \mathcal{A}(\text{id}(\alpha), \text{id}(x\alpha))$, so \mathcal{A}' forces a collision to occur whenever the discrete logarithm is computed correctly, even if \mathcal{A} does not). The number of possible values of $t \in \mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z}$ is no greater than the number of possible values of $x \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, hence (8) holds.

We now bound the probability that \mathcal{A}' wins the game. Consider any particular execution of the game, and let $F_{ij} = F_i - F_j$. We claim that for all i and j such that $F_{ij} \neq 0$,

$$\Pr_t [F_{ij}(t) = 0] \leq \frac{1}{p}. \quad (9)$$

We have $F_{ij}(X) = aX + b$ for some $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z}$ with a and b not both zero. If a is zero then $F_{ij}(t) = b \neq 0$ for all $t \in \mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z}$ and (9) holds. Otherwise the map $[a]: t \mapsto at$ is a nonzero endomorphism of the abelian group $\mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z}$, so $\ker[a]$ thus has order at most p^{e-1} . The set $\{t \in \mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z} : at = -b\}$ is either empty or has cardinality $\#\ker[a]$, thus

$$\Pr_t [F_{ij}(t) = 0] = p^{-e} \#\{t \in \mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z} : at = -b\} \leq p^{-e} p^{e-1} = \frac{1}{p},$$

proving (9).

If \mathcal{A}' wins the game then there must exist an $F_{ij} \neq 0$ for which $F_{ij}(t) = 0$. Furthermore, since $F_{ij}(t) = 0$ if and only if $F_{ji}(t) = 0$, we may assume $i < j$. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{t, \text{id}, \tau} [\mathcal{A}' \text{ wins the game}] &\leq \Pr_{t, \text{id}, \tau} [F_{ij}(t) = 0 \text{ for some } F_{ij} \neq 0 \text{ with } i < j] \\ &\leq \sum_{i < j, F_{ij} \neq 0} \Pr_t [F_{ij}(t) = 0] \\ &\leq \binom{s}{2} \frac{1}{p} < \frac{s^2}{2p}, \end{aligned}$$

where we have used a union bound ($\Pr[A \cup B] \leq \Pr(A) + \Pr(B)$) to bound the sum. \square

Corollary 10.6. *Let $G = \langle \alpha \rangle$ be a cyclic group of prime order N . Every deterministic generic algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem in G uses at least $(\sqrt{2} + o(1))\sqrt{N}$ group operations.*

The baby-steps giant-steps algorithm uses $(2 + o(1))\sqrt{N}$ group operations in the worst case, so this lower bound is tight up to a constant factor, but there is a slight gap. In fact, the baby-steps giant-steps method is not quite optimal; the constant factor in the upper bound can be improved via [2] (but this still leaves a small gap).

Let us now extend Theorem 10.5 to the case where the black box also supports the generation of random group elements for a cost of one group operation. We first note that having the algorithm generate random elements itself by computing $z\alpha$ for random $z \in \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$ does not change the lower bound significantly if only a small number of random elements are used; this applies to all of the algorithms we have considered.

Corollary 10.7. *Let $G = \langle \alpha \rangle$ be a cyclic group of prime order N . Every generic Monte Carlo algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem in G that uses $o(\sqrt{N}/\log N)$ random group elements uses at least $(1 + o(1))\sqrt{N}$ group operations.*

This follows immediately from Theorem 10.5, since a Monte Carlo algorithm is required to succeed with probability bounded above $1/2$. In the Pollard- ρ algorithm, assuming it behaves like a truly random walk, the number of steps required before the probability of a collision exceeds $1/2$ is $\sqrt{2\log 2} \approx 1.1774$, so there is again only a small gap in the constant factor between the lower bound and the upper bound.

In the case of a Las Vegas algorithm, we can obtain a lower bound by supposing that the algorithm terminates as soon as it finds a non-trivial collision (in the proof, this corresponds to a nonzero F_{ij} with $F_{ij}(t) = 0$). Ignoring the $O(\log N)$ additive term, this occurs within m steps with probability at most $m^2/(2p)$. Summing over m from 1 to $\sqrt{2p}$ and supposing that the algorithm terminates in exactly m steps with probability $(m^2 - (m-1)^2)/(2p)$, the expected number of steps is $2\sqrt{2p}/3 + o(\sqrt{p})$.

Corollary 10.8. *Let $G = \langle \alpha \rangle$ be a cyclic group of prime order N . Every generic Las Vegas algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem in G that generates an expected $o(\sqrt{N}/\log N)$ random group elements uses at least $(2\sqrt{2}/3 + o(1))\sqrt{N}$ expected group operations.*

Here the constant factor $2\sqrt{2}/3 \approx 0.9428$ in the lower bound is once again only slightly smaller than the constant factor $\sqrt{\pi/2} \approx 1.2533$ in the upper bound given by the Pollard- ρ algorithm (under a random walk assumption).

Now let us consider a generic algorithm that generates a large number of random elements, say $R = N^{1/3+\delta}$ for some $\delta > 0$. The cost of computing $z\alpha$ for R random values of z can be bounded by $2R + O(N^{1/3})$. If we let $e = \lceil \lg N/3 \rceil$ and precompute $c\alpha$, $c2^e\alpha$, and $c2^{2e}\alpha$ for $c \in [1, 2^e]$, we can then compute $z\alpha$ for any $z \in [1, N]$ using just 2 group operations. We thus obtain the following corollary, which applies to every generic group algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem.

Corollary 10.9. *Let $G = \langle \alpha \rangle$ be a cyclic group of prime order N . Every generic Las Vegas algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem in G uses an expected $\Omega(\sqrt{N})$ group operations.*

In fact, we can be more precise: the implied constant factor is at least $\sqrt{2}/2$.

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