18.600: Lecture 24

Covariance and some conditional expectation exercises

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Outline

Covariance and correlation

Paradoxes: getting ready to think about conditional expectation

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- Since $f(x, y) = f_X(x)f_Y(y)$ this factors as $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} h(y)f_Y(y)dy \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(x)f_X(x)dx = E[h(Y)]E[g(X)].$

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- ▶ Covariance formula E[XY] E[X]E[Y], or "expectation of product minus product of expectations" is frequently useful.
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- General statement of bilinearity of covariance:

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Special case:

$$\operatorname{Var}(\sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \operatorname{Var}(X_i) + 2 \sum_{(i,j): i < j} \operatorname{Cov}(X_i, X_j).$$

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- No. Uncorrelated just means E[(X E[X])(Y E[Y])] = 0, i.e., the outcomes where (X E[X])(Y E[Y]) is positive (the upper right and lower left quadrants, if axes are drawn centered at (E[X], E[Y])) balance out the outcomes where this quantity is negative (upper left and lower right quadrants). This is a much weaker statement than independence.

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- ▶ Reduces problem to computing $Cov(X_i, X_j)$ (for $i \neq j$) and $Var(X_i)$.

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- ► Fairly dark as math humor goes (and no offense intended to anyone...) but dilemma is interesting.

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- ➤ You offer me a deal. I give you sack 1, you give me sacks 2 and 3. I give you sack 2 and you give me sacks 4 and 5. On the *n*th stage, I give you sack *n* and you give me sacks 2*n* and 2*n* + 1. Continue until I say stop.

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the nth stage, I give you sack n and you give me sacks 2n and 2n + 1. Continue until I say stop.
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- ▶ Lets me get arbitrarily rich. But if I go on forever, I return every sack given to me. If *n*th sack confers right to spend *n*th day in heaven, leads to hell-forever paradox.
- ▶ I make infinitely many good trades and end up with less than I started with. "Paradox" is really just existence of 2-to-1 map from (smaller set) {2,3,...} to (bigger set) {1,2,...}.

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- Every pile is bigger after transfer (and this can be true even if banker takes a portion of each pile as a fee).
- Banker seemed to make you richer (every pile got bigger) but really just reshuffled your infinite wealth.

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- Kind of a disguised version of money pile paradox. But more subtle. One has to replace "jth pile of money" with "restriction of expectation sum to scenario that first chosen envelop has 10^j". Switching indeed makes each pile bigger.
- ▶ However, "Higher expectation given amount in first envelope" may not be right notion of "better." If S is payout with switching, T is payout without switching, then S has same law as T-1. In that sense S is worse.

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- ▶ Paradoxes can arise even when total transaction is finite with probability one (as in envelope problem).