

## 18.600: Lecture 24

# Covariance and some conditional expectation exercises

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Covariance and correlation

Paradoxes: getting ready to think about conditional expectation

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- ▶ Since  $f(x, y) = f_X(x)f_Y(y)$  this factors as  $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} h(y)f_Y(y)dy \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(x)f_X(x)dx = E[h(Y)]E[g(X)]$ .

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- ▶ Covariance (like variance) can also be written a different way. Write  $\mu_X = E[X]$  and  $\mu_Y = E[Y]$ . If laws of  $X$  and  $Y$  are known, then  $\mu_X$  and  $\mu_Y$  are just constants.

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- ▶ Special case:

$$\text{Var}\left(\sum_{i=1}^n X_i\right) = \sum_{i=1}^n \text{Var}(X_i) + 2 \sum_{(i,j): i < j} \text{Cov}(X_i, X_j).$$

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- ▶ Are uncorrelated random variables always independent?
- ▶ No. Uncorrelated just means  $E[(X - E[X])(Y - E[Y])] = 0$ , i.e., the outcomes where  $(X - E[X])(Y - E[Y])$  is positive (the upper right and lower left quadrants, if axes are drawn centered at  $(E[X], E[Y])$ ) balance out the outcomes where this quantity is negative (upper left and lower right quadrants). This is a much weaker statement than independence.

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- ▶ Reduces problem to computing  $\text{Cov}(X_i, X_j)$  (for  $i \neq j$ ) and  $\text{Var}(X_i)$ .

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- ▶ Fairly dark as math humor goes (and no offense intended to anyone...) but dilemma is interesting.

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- ▶ Lets me get arbitrarily rich. But if I go on forever, I return every sack given to me. If  $n$ th sack confers right to spend  $n$ th day in heaven, leads to hell-forever paradox.

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- ▶ When you agree to stay in hell  $k$ th day, you get (in exchange) heaven for all odd multiples of  $2^{k-1}$ . Seems a good bargain...
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- ▶ You offer me a deal. I give you sack 1, you give me sacks 2 and 3. I give you sack 2 and you give me sacks 4 and 5. On the  $n$ th stage, I give you sack  $n$  and you give me sacks  $2n$  and  $2n + 1$ . Continue until I say stop.
- ▶ Lets me get arbitrarily rich. But if I go on forever, I return every sack given to me. If  $n$ th sack confers right to spend  $n$ th day in heaven, leads to hell-forever paradox.
- ▶ In both stories, make infinitely many good trades and end up with less than I started with. "Paradox" is existence of 2-to-1 map from (smaller set)  $\{2, 3, \dots\}$  to (bigger set)  $\{1, 2, \dots\}$ .

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- ▶ Banker seemed to make you richer (every pile got bigger) but really just reshuffled your infinite wealth.

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
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- ▶ However, “Higher expectation given amount in first envelope” may not be right notion of “better.” If  $S$  is payout with switching,  $T$  is payout without switching, then  $S$  has same law as  $T - 1$ . In that sense  $S$  is worse.



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- ▶ Paradoxes can arise even when total transaction is finite with probability one (as in envelope problem).